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CONVICTION OF NON-CHARGED OFFENSES: THE
NEW TEST OF PEOPLE .COLE
In criminal trials both the federal and the state constitutional re-
quirements of due process demand that a defendant be notified of the
charges against him.1 The federal requirement of notice is explicit: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." 2 The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that reasonable notice of the
charges against him is a basic right of each defendant.3 The California
Constitution also provides that each defendant shall be informed of the
complaint against him.4 The California Supreme Court has recognized
notice of the charges as being an essential element of due process in a
criminal proceeding. Thus, in state criminal procedures, a defendant
must be provided with notice of the crime of which he is accused.
Although in most instances the due process requirement of notice
is satisfied by the formal charging papers, occasionally, the courts have
allowed a conviction of a non-charged offense to stand. While the lack
of a formal charge would seem to imply in itself that due process has
been violated because there has been no specific notice to the defend-
ant, courts have looked for actual notice to the defendant to decide if
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14. Although both constitutions refer
to the need for notice, presumably under Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), such a
fundamental right would be applicable to all states by operation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Duncan extended the sixth amendment right to trial by jury to state criminal proceed-
ings for serious offenses. The Court briefly reviewed the variety of language in decisions
extending Bill of Rights guarantees to state criminal proceedings. In k footnote discussing
the "incorporation' debate," the Court defined a fundamental procedure as one that is "nec-
essary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty," and not necessarily one that is
"fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined." Id. at 149-50
n.14.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
4. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 14 states:
A person charged with a felony by complaint subscribed under penalty of
perjury and on file in a court in the county where the felony is triable shall be taken
without unnecessary delay before a magistrate of that court. The magistrate shall
immediately give the defendant a copy of the complaint, inform the defendant of the
defendant's right to counsel, allow the defendant a reasonable time to send for
counsel, and on the defendant's request read the complaint to the defendant.
(emphasis added).
5. People v. Cannady, 8 Cal. 3d 379, 389, 503 P.2d 585, 592, 105 Cal. Rptr. 129, 136
(1972): "A defendant cannot be convicted of an offense.., not charged against him by
indictment or information .... "
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the mandate of due process has been met. There are two different situ-
ations in which a conviction of a non-charged offense will not be re-
versed for lack of notice. First, such a conviction will be upheld if the
court finds that the conviction was based on an offense that in some
manner is a part of the offense with which the defendant was charged.
In this situation, the non-charged offense is often termed a lesser-in-
cluded offense.6 Second, such a conviction will be upheld if there is
evidence in the record from which the court can find an informal
amendment of the charging papers.7 While allowing these exceptions,
until recently the California courts have followed the general rule that
a defendant may not be convicted of a non-charged offense.
I. THE CALIFORNIA TESTS
California courts have recognized two tests under which a defend-
ant can be convicted of a non-charged, lesser-included offense.8 The
first of these, the "necessarily-included offense" test, is based on the
elements of the crime. If the elements of one crime encompass all the
elements of another crime such that the one cannot be committed with-
out also committing the other, the latter offense is said to be necessarily
included within the first.9 This test seems to meet due process require-
ments because the requisite notice to the defendant can be found in the
identity of the elements. California Penal Code section 115910 ex-
pressly authorizes a jury to convict a defendant of any necessarily in-
cluded offenses.
The second test for a lesser-included offense has been called the
6. For a general discussion of the lesser-included offense doctrine see Comment, The
Included Offense Doctrine in California, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 870 (1963).
7. An informal amendment may result in a waiver of an objection to lack of notice
because in such a case the defendant impliedly consents to a conviction on the less serious
offense. See Comment, Convictions of Unincluded Lesser Offenses: Informal Amendments
andPlea Bargains, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1075 (1974). See also text accompanying notes 58-86
infra for examples of informal amendment.
8. See People v. St. Martin, 1 Cal. 3d 524, 536, 463 P.2d 390, 396-97, 83 Cal. Rptr. 166,
172-73 (1970):
Two different types of necessarily included offenses have been recognized in
this state. First, where one offense cannot be committed without committing an-
other offense, the latter offense is a necessarily included offense. Second, a lesser
offense is necessarily included if it is within the offense specifically charged in the
accusatory pleading, as distinguished from the statutory definition of the crime.
(citations omitted). See also B. WITKN, CALIFOaNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 541-43
(1963).
9. In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171, 174, 288 P.2d 5, 7 (1955).
10. "The jury, or the judge if ajury trial is waived, may find the defendant guilty of any
offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged, or
of an attempt to commit the offense." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1159 (West 1980).
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"accusatory pleading" test. Under this test, the defendant may be con-
victed of any offense revealed by the specific facts alleged in the indict-
ment or information. 1 This test also seems to meet due process
requirements by requiring actual, if not formal, notice to the defendant.
The defendant is given notice of the crimes against which he must de-
fend himself from the facts that he must refute in the accusatory plead-
ings.
In addition to these two tests, California appellate courts have also
affirmed a defendant's conviction of a non-charged offense if there is
evidence of an informal amendment of the charging papers. Thus, if
the record reveals that the defendant agreed to the lesser charge by
requesting an instruction on the offense or by other active behavior, he
may not later complain of lack of notice. In these cases, the defend-
ant's behavior either shows that he has had the proper notice or that he
has waived such notice.1
2
In June 1979, a California Court of Appeal broadened the basis on
which a conviction of a non-charged offense can be upheld. In effect,
the new test bypasses the traditional concepts of lesser-included of-
fenses, and informal amendments to create a new category in which
non-charged offense convictions may be upheld. This new test can be
characterized as the "lack of objection" test.
II. PEOPLE V COLE
The lack of objection test was announced in People v. Cole. 3 One
of the defendant's contentions on appeal was that his conviction for
assault with a deadly weapon'4 was improper because it is not a lesser-
included offense of the crime with which he was charged, assault with
intent to commit murder.' From the evidence at trial, one can sympa-
11. People v. Marshall, 48 Cal. 2d 394, 309 P.2d 456 (1957). In this case, the defendant
was charged with robbery under the Penal Code, but was convicted of felony auto theft
under § 503 of the Vehicle Code. The court decided that, "Because the information charged
defendant with taking 'an automobile,' he was put on notice that he should be prepared to
defend against a showing that he took that particular kind of personal property." 48 Cal. 2d
at 405, 309 P.2d at 463.
12. See text accompanying notes 58-70 infra.
13. 94 Cal. App. 3d 854, 155 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1979).
14. The defendant was convicted of a violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a) (West
Supp. 1976), assault with a deadly weapon. He was charged with violating CAL. PENAL
CODE § 217 (West Supp. 1976) (amended 1978), assault with intent to commit murder.
15. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 860, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 895. The other issues on appeal were the
propriety of the lower court's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial based upon
newly discovered evidence, id. at 859, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 894, a claimed error in the jury
finding that the defendant used a firearm, id. at 864, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 898, a proposed
striking of a section of the minute order, id. at 865, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 898, and a claimed
1980]
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thize with the court's reluctance to overturn the conviction. The evi-
dence indicated that the defendant had argued with the victim, a
customer in a bar that the defendant was managing for his common-
law wife. After the argument, the defendant went behind the bar, got a
handgun, came up behind the victim, shot him in the back of the head,
and then, while the victim fell to the floor, struck him over the head
with the handgun. The victim was treated at a hospital for a gunshot
wound to the back of his head and for a laceration on his forehead.
The defendant was charged by information with one count of assault
with intent to commit murder, enhanced with a firearm use allegation16
and a great bodily injury charge, and with one count of possession of a
concealable firearm by a felon. He pleaded not guilty to both counts
and denied the great bodily injury charge and the firearm use allega-
tion. Trial was by jury. 7
As the court recognized, under either of the two traditional tests
for upholding such convictions as a lesser-included offense, the convic-
tion could not stand.18 Under the necessarily included offense test, the
elements of assault with a deadly weapon are not all included in the
offense of assault with intent to commit murder. As another court said
on the same issue, "Not every assault with intent to commit murder
implies the employment of a deadly weapon."' 9 Similarly, the accusa-
tory pleading test was not met because the prosecutor did not allege as
part of the formal accusation that the defendant used a deadly weapon
in the assault. The use enhancement allegation is insufficient in itself to
provide this pait of the accusation.20 Although there has been no Call-
improper enhancement of the penalty. Id. Only the latter two issues were decided in de-
fendant's favor.
16. The use of a firearm during the commission of a felony invokes CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 12022.5 (West 1980), which provides:
Any person who personally uses a firearm in the' commission or attempted
commission of a felony, shall, upon conviction of such felony or attempted felony,
in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or at-
tempted felony of which he has been convicted, be punished by an additional term
of two years, unless use of a firearm is an element of the offense of which he was
convicted.
The additional term provided by this section may be imposed in cases of as-
sault with a deadly weapon under Section 245.
17. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 857-59, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94.
18. Id. at 861-62, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
19. People v. Ramos, 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 538, 101 Cal. Rptr. 230, 235 (1972). The
Attorney General admitted that assault with intent to commit murder does not include all
elements of assault with a deadly weapon. The Cole court does not discuss this test but
merely states that case law supports the view that the elements are not the same. 94 Cal.
App. 3d at 861, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
20. Id. at 862, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
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fornia Supreme Court ruling on the issue, the appellate courts, with one
exception,2" have held that a firearm use allegation may not be used to
determine whether a lesser offense is included in the accusation.22 The
courts have given two reasons for so holding. First, a use allegation is
not part of the charge of an offense but is the means provided by the
legislature for increasing the penalty when a firearm is used in commit-
ting the offense.23 Second, holding otherwise would necessitate giving
a jury instruction on assault with a deadly weapon in all cases in which
the use allegation is present.24
Unable to use either of the traditional tests of a lesser-included
offense to uphold the conviction, the Cole court turned to a 1960 deci-
sion by the California Supreme Court, and through a reinterpretation
of that case, upheld the defendant's conviction.
III. PEOPLE V COLLINS
People v. Cole reinterprets People v. Collins.5 In Collins, the de-
fendant was accused of forcible rape, but was convicted of a specific
type of rape, statutory rape.26 The information did not include the fact
21. The only case that possibly indicates otherwise is People v. Gray, 91 Cal. App. 3d
545, 154 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1979):
Defendant admits the existence of authority holding that the firearm use and bod-
ily injury allegations are not part of the accusation. Penal Code sections 954, 969c,
969d, and 12022.7 (which govern the lodging of enhancement charges) indicate
that the firearm use and bodily injury allegations become part of the allegations of
the information which was not discussed in either Wilson or Orr ... However,
we do not need to resolve this issue here for the reasons discussed below.
91 Cal. App. 3d at 557 n.14, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 562 n.14 (citations omitted). Although the
court did not decide the issue, it indicated a preference for considering the use enhancement
allegation as part of the accusation. Justice H. C. Brown had previously expressed a similar
view in People v. Wilson, 62 Cal. App. 3d 370, 377, 132 Cal. Rptr. 813, 817 (1976) (dissent-
ing opinion) ("Under the test that looks at the facts against which defendant must defend, no
reason exists to ignore what is obviously stated. . . ."). Nevertheless, the court in Cole,
composed of the same panel which decided Gray, did not follow this reasoning but, instead,
created an entirely new test.
22. See, e.g., People v. Henry, 14 Cal. App. 3d 89, 92, 91 Cal. Rptr. 841, 842-43 (1970)
(defendant had an additional penalty imposed under CAL. PENAL CODE 12022.5 (West
1970) (most recent amendment 1977) after being convicted of first degree robbery); People v.
Orr, 43 Cal. App. 3d 666, 673-74, 117 Cal. Rptr. 738, 742-43 (1974) (defendant unsuccess-
fully contended, among other complaints, that the court should have given a sua sponte
instruction on exhibiting a firearm because of the use enhancement allegation).
23. 14 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
24. People v. Benjamin, 52 Cal. App. 3d 63, 72, 124 Cal. Rptr. 799, 805-06 (1975) (de-
fendant unsuccessfully contended that a sua sponte instruction of assault with a deadly
weapon should have been given at his trial for murder).
25. 54 Cal. 2d 57, 351 P.2d 326, 4 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1960).
26. The charge was violation of subdivision 3 of former CAL. PENAL CODE § 261, and
the conviction was of subdivision 1 of the same section. This code section was amended in
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that the victim was fifteen years old, but the evidence of her age was
undisputed at the preliminary hearing and at the trial, which was with-
out a jury.27 In upholding the conviction in a short opinion, the court
outlined the considerations that led to its decision: (1) Initially, the
court noted that the subdivisions of the penal code section "do not state
different offenses but merely define the different circumstances under
which an act of intercourse constitutes the crime of rape."2 (2) Then,
the court acknowledged that "[a]n accused should be advised of the
charge against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity
to prepare and present his defense,"2 9 and interpreted this as requiring
notice before trial of any variation in the subsection charged. (3) Fi-
nally, the court stated that "[t]he decisive question in the present case is
whether the variance was of such a substantial character as to have
misled defendants in preparing their defense."3 The court found that
in Collins the defendants were not misled because the attorney for one
defendant had stated at the preliminary hearing that the evidence
showed only statutory rape. In addition, the defendants did not claim
that they could have disputed the age of the prosecuting witness.31
In reaching its decision, the court in Collins acted consistently with
the California tests for upholding convictions of non-charged offenses.
Although the subdivision was not specifically charged, by interpreting
the statute as prohibiting one crime, rape, and as enumerating the ways
in which that crime could be committed, the court implied that the
crime was actually charged. Having been charged with the crime, the
defendant only needed notice before the trial of any variation in the
specifics to be proved. Furthermore, there was some defense participa-
tion related to the alternative of a statutory rape conviction. Thus, the
aggregate facts in Collins place the case within the traditional tests.
A. Cole s Analysis
The court in People v. Cole analyzed the facts of People v. Collins
selectively. When restating the facts of the case that it presumably
deemed significant, the discussion omitted several crucial elements.3 2
The discussion did not include the fact that the defense attorney had
1970 to eliminate the statutory rape subsection. That act is now a violation of CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261.5 (West 1980).
27. 54 Cal. 2d at 58, 351 P.2d at 327, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
28. Id. at 59, 351 P.2d at 328, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 60, 351 P.2d at 328, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
32. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 862, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98.
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expressed the view at the preliminary hearing that the evidence showed
only the offense of which the defendant was ultimately convicted. The
Cole opinion also omitted the fact that the trial was without a jury.
33
The court instead pointed out that the close relationship between as-
sault with intent to commit murder and assault with a deadly weapon is
comparable to the relationship between the statutory subdivisions of
the crime in People v. Collins.34
Continuing its analysis, the Cole court focused its attention on the
third factor discussed in the Collins decision: "The crux of the Collins
decision is that variance between the offense charged and a lesser of-
fense of which a defendant is ultimately convicted will be deemed ma-
terial only if the defendant was misled to his prejudice and prevented
from preparing an effective defense."3 In applying this standard to the
case before it, the Cole court stated that the testimony at the prelimi-
nary hearing gave the defendant early notice that the assault with
which he was charged involved a deadly weapon. It emphasized that
the defendant did not claim on appeal that he would have relied on a
different defense had the charge been otherwise.36 Finally, citing Peo-
ple v. Ramos37 for the proposition that by his conduct at trial a defend-
ant can waive his right to complain, the court noted that defense
counsel made no objection when the trial judge announced his intent to
instruct on the lesser offense.38 Using this analysis, the court in People
v. Cole has bypassed the concept of lesser-included offenses and ne-
gated the requirement of waiver-like behavior.3 9 Neither of these situa-
tions was present. The conviction was seemingly affirmed solely on the
basis of lack of objection. In order to appreciate the full implications of
the analysis of Collins in Cole, it is instructive to compare that analysis
with others that have been made.
B. Analysis of Other Cases
1. The single offense concept
One of the first cases construing People v. Collins was People v.
Leech,4° which was expressly disapproved in Cole.41 In People v.
33. See text accompanying notes 71-80 infra.
34. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 863-64, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
37. 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 101 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1972). Contrast the discussion of Ramos in
the text accompanying notes 46-51 infra with Cole's interpretation.
38. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 864, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
39. See text accompanying notes 56-70 infra for a discussion of waiver-like behavior.
40. 232 Cal. App. 2d 397, 42 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1965).
1980]
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Leech, the charge was assault with a deadly weapon 42 but the convic-
tion was of displaying a weapon in a rude and offensive manner.43 The
evidence at the preliminary hearing had been sufficient to support a
conviction of offensive display, but the court still reversed the convic-
tion. The prosecution had urged that People v. Collins be used to up-
hold the conviction. The court, however, said that the key to the
Collins decision was that the subdivisions of the statute were merely a
recitation of the various ways to commit the same offense. The case at
bar involved two different offenses and, therefore, People v. Collins was
held inapplicable." The court held that the evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing could not be used to augment the pleading when
the offenses were different.45 Thus, the evidence at the preliminary
hearing of guilt of the non-lesser-included offense was irrelevant. The
petition for rehearing was subsequently denied by the California
Supreme Court.' Leech is consistent with the California tests for up-
holding convictions of non-charged offenses.
The California courts of appeal have consistently followed this
"single-offense" interpretation of Collins. The first district in People v.
Escarcega47 explained Collins as allowing the preliminary hearing evi-
dence to support the conviction on the theory that there was "but one
offense."4 The second district, in People v. Baca,49 explained in a note
that the case at bar was governed by Collins because, as in Collins, the
case involved a single crime that can be committed in two ways.50 In
41. "We are of the opinion that the narrow interpretation accorded to the Collins deci-
sion by Leech and its progeny ignores the underlying reasoning of the Collins case and
exalts form over substance." 94 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (Deering 1961) (most recent amendment 1976).
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 417 (Deering 1961) (amended 1977).
44. 232 Cal. App. 2d at 398-99, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
45. Id. at 399-400, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
46. April 14, 1965. Id. at 400, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
47. 43 Cal. App. 3d 391, 117 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1974). The defendant was charged with
assault with a deadly weapon. He requested and was refused an instruction on exhibiting a
deadly weapon.
48. Id. at 396-97 n.l, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 598 n.1 (emphasis in original).
49. 247 Cal. App. 2d 487, 55 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1966). The case involved an accusation of
assault on a police officer in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(b) (West Supp. 1965)
(most recent amendment 1976) and a conviction of assault by means of force likely to pro-
duce bodily injury in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (West Supp. 1965) (most recent
amendment 1976).
50. 247 Cal. App. 2d at 491 n.3, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 684 n.3: "Here, the offense involved was
that of aggravated assault on a police officer-an offense which. .. may be committed in
either of two ways .... The present case, therefore, is governed by the principles ex-
pounded in People v. Collins, and not by those set forth in Leech." (citation omitted).
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another second district case, People v. Puckett,5 the prosecution urged
that the evidence at the preliminary hearing augmented the informa-
tion to provide notice to the defendant. The court, however, approved
of the Leech limitation of Collins to single-offense cases and reversed
the conviction.5" The fourth district, in People v. Tatem," noted as the
distinguishing feature of People v. Collins its single offense concept.
5 4
The single offense interpretation of the Collins case is in accord with
the general principle the courts follow of using a lesser offense test to
uphold convictions of a non-charged offense. Thus, when disapproving
the interpretation of Collins in "Leech and its progeny"" the Cole
court not only disapproved a long line of cases from a variety of Cali-
fornia jurisdictions56 but also departed from the lesser included offense
doctrine.
2. Informal amendment or waiver
The second traditional test used to determine whether to affirm a
conviction of a non-charged offense is whether there is some kind of
positive evidence in the record that the defendant was aware of the
lesser charge and the need to defend against it. Often, this ground
alone is used to affirm such convictions. As indicated, through this pos-
itive evidence the courts find assurance that the defendant has not been
denied due process, but has had prior notice of the charge against him,
or not having this notice, has chosen to waive his right to notice. Most
cases using this test rely on actual defense participation in the court's
51. 44 Cal. App. 3d 607, 118 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975).
52. Id. at 612, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
53. 62 Cal. App. 3d 655, 133 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976). The case involved a charge of bur-
glary in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 1970) (amended 1977, 1978) and a
conviction of theft under CAL. PENAL CODE § 484(a) (West 1970).
54. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 658, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 266-67. Tatem, like Collins, was submitted
on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. Unlike the defendant in Collins, however, the
defendant in this case moved to dismiss after hearing the trial court's conclusion but before
judgment was pronounced, on the ground that the information did not charge him with the
crime for which the court was about to convict him. The court of appeal reversed on the
ground that the conviction was for a non-charged, non-lesser-included offense. Id. at 658-
59, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 266-67. Presumably, under Cole such a motion is now essential in
order to preserve the issue for appeal. The reasoning in the Tatem decision focuses not on
the denial of the defendant's motion, but on the nature of the crimes. Other lower court
decisions have been reversed when there was no objection by the defendant at the trial court
level. See, e.g., People v. Leech, 232 Cal. App. 2d 397, 42 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1965); People v.
Escarcega, 43 Cal. App. 3d 391, 117 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1974); People v. Puckett, 44 Cal. App. 3d
607, 118 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975).
55. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
56. In summary, Leech has been expressly followed in the first, the second, and the
fourth districts. Until Cole, it had not been expressly disapproved.
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
instruction on the lesser offense. A typical case, cited in People v.
Cole,57 is People v. Ramos.5 8
a. amendment or waiver injury trials
Like People v. Cole, People v. Ramos involved a defendant
charged in the information with assault with intent to commit murder5 9
and convicted after a jury trial of assault with a deadly weapon.60 The
appellate court in Ramos found that "assault with a deadly weapon is
not a lesser necessarily included offense within Penal Code section
217.''61 Thus, it does not meet the first test of lesser-included offenses.
Furthermore, the court in Ramos agreed with the court in Leech that
the evidence from a preliminary hearing "could not be used to augment
the charge so as to make assault with a deadly weapon a lesser included
offense within the offense charged. 62 Thus, the preliminary hearing
could not supplement the accusatory pleading to permit a finding that
the defendant was given notice. Despite these findings, the court up-
held the conviction because the "[d]efendant's own actions not only
show that he realized that he was put to the task of defending against
the alternate charge of assault with a deadly weapon, but also show
that he wanted the jury to think that that offense was all that he really
was defending against." 63 The defendant had requested a jury instruc-
tion on the elements of assault with a deadly weapon. 4 Thus, the court
affirmed the conviction on the theory that there was an informal
amendment to the information to which the defendant had con-
sented.65
The defendant's conduct in Ramos could also be considered the
equivalent of a waiver of his constitutional right to be notified of the
charge against him.66 It is, of course, possible to waive one's constitu-
tional rights. The general test for a waiver of a fundamental constitu-
57. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 863-64, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
58. 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 101 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1972). This element is also found in Collins.
See text accompanying note 31 supra.
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 217 (West 1966) (amended 1976, 1978).
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (West 1966) (most recent amendment 1976).
61. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 538, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
62. Id. at 537 n.4, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 234 n.4.
63. Id. at 539, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36.
64. Id. at 539, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
65. Id.
66. For recent reviews of waiver and forfeiture of constitutional rights, see Hill, The
Forfeiture of ConstitutionalRights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1050 (1978); Wes-
ten, A way from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal
Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1214 (1977).
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tional right is found in Johnson v. Zerbst:67 "A waiver is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege."' 68 The United States Supreme Court has identified a "person's
right to reasonable notice of a charge against him" as "basic in our
system of jurisprudence." 69 By requesting an instruction on a charge,
the defendant is, in effect, acknowledging that the facts may show he
committed that offense and that he knows that the charge could have
been brought against him. Thus, his action can be construed as a
waiver of the right to go through the entire process again on this alter-
nate crime. It is more difficult to see that the mere lack of an objection,
as in Cole, is behavior constituting a waiver. The absence of an objec-
tion does not indicate that the right has been intentionally relinquished
or that the right was even known.
Other decisions affirming the conviction of a non-charged but not
lesser-included offense after a jury trial likewise stress the defendant's
affirmative conduct. The fifth district court of appeal affirmed a battery
conviction on a murder charge in People v. Mayes °.7  The majority
opinion stressed that "the defendant actually requested the court to
submit the battery issue to the jury .... ,,71 The dissent argued for
reversal, presumably in spite of this request, because the offense was
non-charged and non-lesser-included.72 Similarly, a divided court in
the second district affirmed a conviction for displaying a weapon in a
rude and offensive manner on a charge of assault with a deadly weapon
in People v. Rasher.73 The majority stressed that before trial the de-
fendant had submitted a requested instruction on the lesser offense.74
The dissent would have reversed because at the end of the trial the
defendant withdrew his request.75 Taken as a group, these cases indi-
cate that in a jury trial if the defendant shows by his conduct that he
agreed to the non-charged, non-lesser-included offense, he thereby
waives his right to complain on appeal. The decision in Cole is not
consistent with these cases because the defendant in Cole did not show
by any affirmative behavior that he had waived his right.
67. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
68. Id. at 464.
69. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
70. 262 Cal. App. 2d 195, 68 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1968).
71. Id. at 201, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
72. Id. (Conley, P.J., dissenting).
73. 3 Cal. App. 3d 798, 83 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1970).
74. Id. at 801-02, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27.
75. Id. at 805-08, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 729-31 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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b. amendment or waiver in non-jury trials
A few California cases seem to offer a more relaxed standard by
which to determine whether the defendant's behavior amounted to a
waiver. These cases were all submitted, however, on the basis of their
preliminary transcripts. The importance of the difference between a
jury trial and a non-jury trial was stressed in People v. Powell.76 This
case was submitted on the transcript of the preliminary examination,
which contained evidence sufficient to support the conviction of the
non-charged offense. The defendant's failure to object to the lesser of-
fense was found to imply his consent to it because had he objected at
that point in the proceedings there still existed a procedure to amend
the information.77 When distinguishing People v. Leech,78 a decision
written by the same district and division of the court of appeal, the
court said, "Where the trial is by jury there is no practicable way of
amending the information after the jury has made known its decision
to find the defendant guilty of the lesser but nonincluded offense."'79
Similar decisions can be explained on this basis. Thus, in People v.
Chandler0 the record showed that the defendant knew the range of
possible offenses involved and actually had discussed the lesser charge
with his attorney.8 The court affirmed the conviction. In People v.
HenseP2 the defendant had participated in discussions about the lesser
offenses and had asked for a reduction to an offense that contained the
same key element as the non-charged offense about which he was com-
plaining on appeal.83 Again, the court affirmed the conviction. The
case permitting the least overt behavior by the defendant when af-
firming the conviction after submission on the preliminary hearing
transcript is People v. Francis.84 In this case the court emphasized that
the defense counsel thanked the trial judge for the conviction on the
76. 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965).
77. Id. at 888, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
78. 232 Cal. App. 2d 397, 42 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1965).
79. 236 Cal. App. 2d at 888, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
80. 234 Cal. App. 2d 705, 44 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1965). The defendant had been charged
with robbery and was convicted of grand theft.
81. Id. at 709, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
82. 233 Cal. App. 2d 834, 43 Cal. Rptr. 865, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 942 (1965).
83. Id. at 839, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 868. The defendant was charged with oral copulation
and convicted of lewd or disorderly conduct in a public place. The defendant had requested
that the court reduce his offense to a violation of§ 650.5 of the Penal Code (West 1970) ("A
person who wilfully and wrongfully commits any act which... openly outrages public
decency, .. ").
84. 71 Cal. 2d 66, 450 P.2d 591, 75 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1969).
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lesser, although non-charged, offense instead of the greater charge.85
Thus, in convictions following submission on the preliminary hearing
transcript there does seem to be a less stringent standard by which to
find a defendant's acquiescence. The relative informality of the pro-
ceedings and the ease with which the information could be amended if
there were an objection make this a logical situation. In People v. Cole,
however, the trial was by jury.
c. amendment or waiver absent in People v. Cole
Under the circumstances of a jury trial, the court has always
looked for positive conduct, as opposed to passivity, on the part of the
defendant before upholding the conviction of a non-charged and non-
lesser-included offense.86 In Cole, the defendant did nothing to en-
courage the inclusion of the lesser offense instruction. The court's only
comment on his behavior was that he did not object.8 7 From the record
revealed by the court, it is impossible to suggest why there was no ob-
jection. Until this decision, no objection was necessary to preserve for
appeal the issue of a non-charged offense conviction. 88 There is in Cole
no evidence of an implied amendment or of a waiver. Thus, Cole can-
not be explained on the basis of the last of the traditional tests for up-
holding convictions of non-charged offenses.
IV. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the Cole interpreta-
tion of Collins is not in accord with the view taken of that case by the
other California appellate courts. Cole can not be explained on the
basis of a lesser-included offense, nor does it conform with other cases
that upheld convictions of non-charged, non-lesser-included offenses
on the basis of an implied amendment or waiver. Thus, although the
decision appears on its face to expand the existing tests for upholding
convictions of non-charged offenses, it does not. It offers a new test.
The new test that Cole sets up is quite broad: a conviction wil be
upheld if (1) there was evidence presented at the preliminary hearing
that could have made the defendant aware of other possible crimes he
may have committed; and (2) he makes no objection to the giving of an
instruction on any of those crimes. This interpretation of Cole, if ap-
85. Id. at 74, 450 P.2d at 596, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
86. See text accompanying notes 60-76 supra.
87. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
88. See note 54 supra.
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plied by the courts, could lead to two direct effects on the present crimi-
nal trial system.
The first effect is of a practical nature. Applying the test of People
v. Cole shifts the issue from a straightforward test of the due process
consideration of notice to the nebulous issue of counsel's competency.
The standard for judging counsel's competency was stated in People v.
Pope89 as being whether "trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be
expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advo-
cates" and whether "counsel's acts or omissions resulted in the with-
drawal of a potentially meritorious defense."9 A failure to object to a
non-charged lesser offense now raises a bar to that issue on appeal and
brings into question the competency of the defendant's counsel. The
question the appellate court must answer shifts from "Was the defend-
ant given the required notice?" to "Why didn't the trial counsel ob-
ject?" Shifting the subject of the question from a well-defined area
with many established precedents to an area of law still requiring inter-
pretation is certain to lead to many appeals.
More important, however, is the effect People v. Cole may have on
the issue of what constitutes due process. Carrying the reasoning in
People v. Cole to its logical conclusion could lead to a change in crimi-
nal procedures. The first steps still would involve a charge of a crime
and some preliminary evidence of that crime. Next would come the
trial. At the last stage of that trial, however, a broad interpretation of
Cole would open the door to an opportunity for the prosecutor to
recharge the defendant with any other appropriate crimes with relative
impunity. The traditional and constitutional procedure in our system
has always been-first the charge, then the trial. The change suggested
by People v. Cole violates that due process requirement.
Karen J Lee
89. 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979).
90. Id. at 425, 590 P.2d at 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
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